Compliance — DORA / NIS2¶
This page maps AppControl's mechanisms to the regulatory requirements of:
- DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554: Digital Operational Resilience Act. In force since 17 January 2025 for financial entities and their critical ICT third-party providers.
- NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555: Network and Information Security 2. Transposed by EU member states by 17 October 2024 for essential and important entities across critical sectors.
For each article we list the mechanism inside AppControl that produces the evidence, the table or log that captures it, and a verification query an auditor can run.
For the architectural design of the mechanisms, see Security Architecture. For backup and retention of the evidence itself, see Backup & Restore.
Table of contents¶
- DORA mapping
- NIS2 mapping (Article 21)
- Exporting evidence for an auditor
- Report endpoint reference
- What AppControl does NOT cover
- Sanctions reference
DORA mapping¶
DORA divides ICT risk management into five pillars. AppControl directly addresses Pillar I (Risk Management Framework — Articles 5–16) and Pillar III (Digital Operational Resilience Testing — Articles 24–27).
Article-by-article mapping¶
| Article | Requirement (paraphrased) | AppControl mechanism | Evidence (table / log / file) | Verification query |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Art. 8(1)(a) | Maintain a comprehensive ICT systems inventory | Applications and components are first-class entities with type, owner, agent, site | applications, components tables |
SELECT id, name, primary_site_id, created_at FROM applications WHERE deleted_at IS NULL; |
| Art. 8(2) | Map dependencies between ICT assets supporting business functions | DAG of components with explicit dependency edges; visualized in Map View | dependencies table; UI Map View |
SELECT from_component_id, to_component_id FROM dependencies WHERE application_id = '<aid>'; |
| Art. 8(3) | Classify ICT assets by criticality | Application-level criticality tag; per-component rebuild_protected flag |
applications.tags, components.rebuild_protected |
SELECT name, tags->>'criticality' FROM applications; |
| Art. 8(4) | Update the inventory on any change | Every config change writes a versioned snapshot | config_versions (append-only, before/after JSONB) |
SELECT entity_id, change_type, created_at FROM config_versions ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 20; |
| Art. 9(1) | Cryptographic protection of data in transit / at rest | mTLS for agent ↔ gateway; TLS for everything else; encrypted backups (see Hardening) | TLS config in deployment manifests | kubectl exec -n appcontrol deploy/appcontrol-gateway -- printenv TLS_ENABLED → true |
| Art. 9(4) | Identity and access management with least-privilege | 5-level RBAC per application + workspaces (site scope) | app_permissions_users, app_permissions_teams, workspace_sites, workspace_members |
SELECT user_id, app_id, permission_level FROM app_permissions_users WHERE expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > now(); |
| Art. 11(1) | Implement and maintain a business continuity policy | DR switchover engine with 6 phases and rollback; dry-run for plan validation | switchover_log, applications.dr_site_id, dry-run results |
SELECT application_id, phase, status, started_at FROM switchover_log ORDER BY started_at DESC LIMIT 20; |
| Art. 11(2) | Test the continuity plan at least annually | Switchover dry-run and drill, chronologically tracked | action_log rows with action_type IN ('switchover','switchover_dry_run') |
SELECT count(*) FROM action_log WHERE action_type LIKE 'switchover%' AND created_at > now() - interval '1 year'; |
| Art. 12(1) | Procedures for the reconstruction of ICT systems after a destructive event | 3-level diagnostic + targeted rebuild engine (rebuild_cmd, rebuild_infra_cmd, bastion) |
action_log rows with action_type = 'rebuild'; components.rebuild_* columns |
SELECT id, name, rebuild_cmd, rebuild_protected FROM components WHERE rebuild_cmd IS NOT NULL; |
| Art. 12(3) | Document the order of recovery and RTO/RPO | DAG order is recorded; per-rebuild RTR (Recovery Time for Rebuild) is measured | action_log.details.rtr_seconds |
SELECT target_id, details->>'rtr_seconds' AS rtr FROM action_log WHERE action_type = 'rebuild' AND status = 'completed'; |
| Art. 16(1) | Record every incident with timestamp, actor, action, outcome | Append-only action_log written before every action runs; state_transitions records every FSM change |
action_log, state_transitions |
SELECT user_id, action_type, target_id, status, created_at FROM action_log WHERE created_at > '<incident_start>' ORDER BY created_at; |
| Art. 16(2) | Retain incident records for a sufficient duration | Configurable retention; recommended 5 years minimum | RETENTION_ACTION_LOG_DAYS env var |
kubectl exec -n appcontrol deploy/appcontrol-backend -- printenv RETENTION_ACTION_LOG_DAYS |
| Art. 17(1) | Notify competent authorities of major incidents | Manual export of action_log + incidents report via API |
/reports/audit, /reports/incidents |
curl /api/v1/reports/audit?from=<t1>&to=<t2> |
| Art. 24 | Maintain a digital operational resilience testing programme | Drill records and dry-run history | switchover_log rows with mode IN ('DRY_RUN','SELECTIVE','PROGRESSIVE'); action_log.dry_run = true |
SELECT application_id, mode, started_at, ended_at FROM switchover_log WHERE mode != 'FULL'; |
| Art. 25 | Test scenarios for cyber-attacks and data corruption | DR drill in supervision mode; corruption-detection workflow | switchover_log with selective mode + diagnostic Level 2 (integrity) results |
SELECT component_id, exit_code FROM check_events WHERE check_type = 'integrity' AND created_at > now() - interval '90 days'; |
| Art. 27 | Report on the outcomes of resilience testing | /reports/compliance and /reports/rto endpoints |
report_compliance.pdf, report_rto.pdf |
curl /api/v1/apps/<id>/reports/compliance |
Append-only guarantee¶
DORA Article 16 requires incident records that cannot be tampered with after the fact. AppControl enforces this at the schema level:
action_log,state_transitions,check_events,switchover_log,config_versionsare append-only by design.UPDATEandDELETEare not used by any backend code path against these tables (CI lint rule).- Retention is implemented as partition drop (
check_events) or row archive (action_log→action_log_archive), never as in-place delete.
Inspect:
-- These tables have a CHECK / trigger or simply no UPDATE/DELETE in code paths
\dt action_log
\dt state_transitions
\dt switchover_log
\dt config_versions
For DORA Article 12 (reconstruction), the config_versions table stores both the before and after of every configuration change as JSONB. Auditors can reconstruct what the system looked like at any point in time:
-- What did application X look like on date Y?
SELECT after FROM config_versions
WHERE entity_id = '<aid>' AND created_at <= '2025-06-01'
ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1;
NIS2 mapping (Article 21)¶
NIS2 Article 21 lists 10 risk-management measures. The table below shows which AppControl mechanism supports each measure.
| Measure (Art. 21.2) | AppControl support | How |
|---|---|---|
| (a) Policies on risk analysis and information system security | Application-level mode (advisory / operate / drill / DR) — explicit choice of autonomy level | UI applications.settings.mode; documented in README |
| (b) Incident handling | FSM + append-only audit; 3-level diagnostic; rebuild engine | action_log, state_transitions, diagnostic endpoints; see DORA Art. 16 |
| © Business continuity (backup, DR, crisis management) | DR switchover (6 phases), dry-run, drill mode | switchover_log; see Disaster Recovery and DORA Art. 11–12 |
| (d) Supply chain security | mTLS-only ingest of agents; signed binary updates; enrollment audit | pki_authorities, enrollment_tokens, signed agent bundles; see Security Architecture §3, §12 |
| (e) Security in network and information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance | SBOM published with every release; Trivy scan in CI; semver-versioned upgrades | release-assets/sbom.cdx.json; UPGRADE.md |
| (f) Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures | Compliance and RTO reports; drill records; hardening checklist | /reports/compliance; HARDENING.md |
| (g) Basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training | Hardening checklist; operator role separation | HARDENING.md |
| (h) Policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and encryption | mTLS, TLS 1.3, scram-sha-256 for DB; encrypted backups | TLS config; BACKUP_RESTORE.md — Encryption |
| (i) Human-resources security, access control policies and asset management | RBAC, workspaces, SAML group sync, share links with expiry | app_permissions_users/teams, workspace_*, saml_group_mappings, app_share_links |
| (j) Multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions | MFA depends on the upstream IdP. AppControl uses OIDC / SAML — enforce MFA in your IdP (Keycloak, Okta, Azure AD). Local-auth flows do not enforce MFA. | OIDC / SAML configuration on the IdP side |
MFA caveat
AppControl does not itself implement MFA. Multi-factor authentication is enforced at the IdP layer (OIDC / SAML). Disable local-auth in production (set APP_ENV=production) so MFA cannot be bypassed.
Exporting evidence for an auditor¶
When an auditor (ACPR, EBA, national NIS2 competent authority, internal compliance) requests evidence, produce a report bundle using the endpoints below. Every report supports a configurable date range.
Audit trail (Art. 16)¶
# Full audit trail for an app over a given period
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/audit?from=2025-01-01&to=2025-12-31" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-o audit-2025.json
# Or organization-wide
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/reports/audit?from=2025-01-01&to=2025-12-31" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-o audit-org-2025.json
The JSON payload contains:
actions[]: every user-initiated action (start, stop, switchover, edit, etc.)state_transitions[]: every component state changeenrollment_events[]: every agent enrollmentbreak_glass_sessions[]: every emergency-access session- For each entry: timestamp, actor (user_id + email), target, result, and a stable hash for chain-of-custody
Compliance report (DORA Article 27)¶
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/compliance?year=2025" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-o compliance-2025.json
Includes:
- Total drills executed (dry-runs + full switchovers)
- Average and worst-case RTO
- Number of incidents (FSM transitions to
FAILEDorUNREACHABLE) - Rebuild events with RTR (Recovery Time for Rebuild)
Incidents and DRP report (Art. 17 + Art. 11)¶
# Incidents
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/incidents?from=2025-01-01" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o incidents-2025.json
# Disaster Recovery Plan execution history
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/pra" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o pra-history.json
Switchovers report (Art. 11 + Art. 25)¶
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/pra" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o switchovers.json
The pra report (Plan de Reprise d'Activité — French acronym for DRP) lists every switchover, dry-run, and drill with phase-by-phase timing.
RTO report (Art. 12)¶
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/rto?year=2025" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o rto-2025.json
Provides actual vs configured RTO per application, with deviation alerts when a switchover exceeded the configured target.
MTTR (Mean Time To Recovery)¶
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/mttr?from=2025-01-01" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o mttr-2025.json
Calculated as the average time between FAILED → RUNNING transitions for an application's components, excluding planned operations.
Activity feed (live audit stream)¶
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/activity?since=2025-12-31T00:00:00Z" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o activity.json
Useful for real-time SIEM ingestion.
PDF bundle (one file per app, for the auditor)¶
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/export?period=2025" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-o appcontrol-evidence-2025.pdf
The PDF aggregates all of the above into a single signed file with:
- Cover page (org name, period, generated-at timestamp)
- DORA article cross-reference for each section
- Audit trail (chronological)
- Incident timeline
- Switchover history with RTO/RPO
- Rebuild history with RTR
- Configuration version snapshots (before/after for every material change)
- Signature footer (SHA-256 of the bundle; cross-references the action log)
The PDF is self-contained — an auditor can reconcile it against the JSON exports above.
Format reference¶
| Endpoint | Format | Default range | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
/audit |
JSON | last 30 days | Pass ?format=csv for spreadsheet ingest |
/incidents |
JSON | last 30 days | Includes root-cause if labeled |
/pra |
JSON | last 12 months | Phase-by-phase switchover detail |
/compliance |
JSON | last year | Aggregate KPIs |
/rto |
JSON | last year | per-app RTO actual vs target |
/mttr |
JSON | last 30 days | per-app MTTR |
/export |
period parameter | Full signed bundle |
Report endpoint reference¶
Defined in crates/backend/src/api/reports/. All endpoints require JWT auth and at least view permission on the target app.
| Endpoint | File | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/audit |
audit.rs |
Full action_log + state_transitions for an app |
GET /reports/audit |
audit.rs |
Org-wide audit (admin only) |
GET /apps/:app_id/activity |
audit.rs |
Live activity feed |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/availability |
availability.rs |
Uptime / downtime per component |
GET /apps/:app_id/health-summary |
availability.rs |
Component-level health rollup |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/compliance |
dora.rs |
Aggregated DORA compliance KPIs |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/rto |
dora.rs |
RTO analysis |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/mttr |
dora.rs |
MTTR analysis |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/pra |
incidents.rs |
DRP / switchover history |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/incidents |
incidents.rs |
Failure incidents |
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/export |
export.rs |
PDF bundle |
All endpoints accept from / to query parameters as ISO 8601 timestamps.
What AppControl does NOT cover¶
Honesty matters for compliance. AppControl is one tool in a regulated stack — these items require other systems.
| Requirement | Why AppControl does not cover it | What does |
|---|---|---|
| Penetration testing (DORA Art. 26, TLPT) | Out of scope — AppControl is the target, not the tester | Third-party Red Team or TIBER-EU-aligned vendor |
| Third-party SBOM tracking for all dependencies | AppControl publishes its own SBOM (CycloneDX) but does not catalog the SBOMs of every system it monitors | Snyk, Dependency-Track, GitHub Advanced Security |
| Business continuity beyond IT (HR, premises, communications) | DORA Art. 11 covers ICT continuity; broader BCM requires more | BCM tool (ServiceNow BCM, Fusion Framework) |
| Vulnerability scanning of monitored hosts | AppControl monitors application state, not OS-level CVEs | Qualys, Tenable, Wiz, native cloud security center |
| Network IDS / IPS (NIS2 21(2)(b)) | AppControl has rate limiting and mTLS auth but is not an IDS | Suricata, Snort, Zscaler, cloud-native WAF |
| Encryption key management (DORA Art. 9, NIS2 21(2)(h)) | AppControl uses keys but does not provide HSM functions | HashiCorp Vault, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault |
| Centralized IAM with MFA | AppControl delegates auth to OIDC / SAML — your IdP enforces MFA | Keycloak, Okta, Azure AD, ADFS |
| Real-time SIEM correlation | AppControl emits JSON logs and audit data; correlation is downstream | Splunk, Elastic SIEM, Datadog, Sentinel |
| Application-layer DLP | AppControl does not inspect business data | Microsoft Purview, Symantec DLP |
| Outsourcing register (DORA Art. 28–30) | AppControl tracks ICT inventory, not third-party contracts | GRC tool (Archer, ServiceNow GRC) |
| Quantitative ICT risk assessment (DORA Art. 6) | AppControl provides metrics (RTO, MTTR, RTR) — quantification of business risk is your CFO's job | Risk-management tool fed by AppControl exports |
AppControl is the operational evidence layer. It supplies the data (DAG, audit, state transitions, RTO measurements) that the items above consume.
Sanctions reference¶
For context, both regulations have material penalties:
DORA¶
- Up to 2 % of the entity's annual global turnover for the firm.
- Up to €1 million for individual senior managers, applied personally.
- Plus reputational sanctions: public naming, business restrictions.
Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 50.
NIS2¶
- Essential entities: up to €10 million or 2 % of global turnover (whichever is higher).
- Important entities: up to €7 million or 1.4 % of global turnover.
- Personal liability for executives in case of gross negligence.
Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Articles 34–35.
These thresholds are the rationale for treating audit retention and reconstruction capability as mandatory rather than nice-to-have.
Reference¶
- Security Architecture — implementation details of each mechanism
- Hardening — operational hardening checklist
- Backup & Restore — retention and off-site evidence storage
- Disaster Recovery — DR drill procedure for Art. 11
- Upgrade — patch-management evidence for NIS2 21(2)(e)
External: