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Compliance — DORA / NIS2

This page maps AppControl's mechanisms to the regulatory requirements of:

  • DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554: Digital Operational Resilience Act. In force since 17 January 2025 for financial entities and their critical ICT third-party providers.
  • NIS2 — Directive (EU) 2022/2555: Network and Information Security 2. Transposed by EU member states by 17 October 2024 for essential and important entities across critical sectors.

For each article we list the mechanism inside AppControl that produces the evidence, the table or log that captures it, and a verification query an auditor can run.

For the architectural design of the mechanisms, see Security Architecture. For backup and retention of the evidence itself, see Backup & Restore.

Table of contents


DORA mapping

DORA divides ICT risk management into five pillars. AppControl directly addresses Pillar I (Risk Management Framework — Articles 5–16) and Pillar III (Digital Operational Resilience Testing — Articles 24–27).

Article-by-article mapping

Article Requirement (paraphrased) AppControl mechanism Evidence (table / log / file) Verification query
Art. 8(1)(a) Maintain a comprehensive ICT systems inventory Applications and components are first-class entities with type, owner, agent, site applications, components tables SELECT id, name, primary_site_id, created_at FROM applications WHERE deleted_at IS NULL;
Art. 8(2) Map dependencies between ICT assets supporting business functions DAG of components with explicit dependency edges; visualized in Map View dependencies table; UI Map View SELECT from_component_id, to_component_id FROM dependencies WHERE application_id = '<aid>';
Art. 8(3) Classify ICT assets by criticality Application-level criticality tag; per-component rebuild_protected flag applications.tags, components.rebuild_protected SELECT name, tags->>'criticality' FROM applications;
Art. 8(4) Update the inventory on any change Every config change writes a versioned snapshot config_versions (append-only, before/after JSONB) SELECT entity_id, change_type, created_at FROM config_versions ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 20;
Art. 9(1) Cryptographic protection of data in transit / at rest mTLS for agent ↔ gateway; TLS for everything else; encrypted backups (see Hardening) TLS config in deployment manifests kubectl exec -n appcontrol deploy/appcontrol-gateway -- printenv TLS_ENABLED → true
Art. 9(4) Identity and access management with least-privilege 5-level RBAC per application + workspaces (site scope) app_permissions_users, app_permissions_teams, workspace_sites, workspace_members SELECT user_id, app_id, permission_level FROM app_permissions_users WHERE expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > now();
Art. 11(1) Implement and maintain a business continuity policy DR switchover engine with 6 phases and rollback; dry-run for plan validation switchover_log, applications.dr_site_id, dry-run results SELECT application_id, phase, status, started_at FROM switchover_log ORDER BY started_at DESC LIMIT 20;
Art. 11(2) Test the continuity plan at least annually Switchover dry-run and drill, chronologically tracked action_log rows with action_type IN ('switchover','switchover_dry_run') SELECT count(*) FROM action_log WHERE action_type LIKE 'switchover%' AND created_at > now() - interval '1 year';
Art. 12(1) Procedures for the reconstruction of ICT systems after a destructive event 3-level diagnostic + targeted rebuild engine (rebuild_cmd, rebuild_infra_cmd, bastion) action_log rows with action_type = 'rebuild'; components.rebuild_* columns SELECT id, name, rebuild_cmd, rebuild_protected FROM components WHERE rebuild_cmd IS NOT NULL;
Art. 12(3) Document the order of recovery and RTO/RPO DAG order is recorded; per-rebuild RTR (Recovery Time for Rebuild) is measured action_log.details.rtr_seconds SELECT target_id, details->>'rtr_seconds' AS rtr FROM action_log WHERE action_type = 'rebuild' AND status = 'completed';
Art. 16(1) Record every incident with timestamp, actor, action, outcome Append-only action_log written before every action runs; state_transitions records every FSM change action_log, state_transitions SELECT user_id, action_type, target_id, status, created_at FROM action_log WHERE created_at > '<incident_start>' ORDER BY created_at;
Art. 16(2) Retain incident records for a sufficient duration Configurable retention; recommended 5 years minimum RETENTION_ACTION_LOG_DAYS env var kubectl exec -n appcontrol deploy/appcontrol-backend -- printenv RETENTION_ACTION_LOG_DAYS
Art. 17(1) Notify competent authorities of major incidents Manual export of action_log + incidents report via API /reports/audit, /reports/incidents curl /api/v1/reports/audit?from=<t1>&to=<t2>
Art. 24 Maintain a digital operational resilience testing programme Drill records and dry-run history switchover_log rows with mode IN ('DRY_RUN','SELECTIVE','PROGRESSIVE'); action_log.dry_run = true SELECT application_id, mode, started_at, ended_at FROM switchover_log WHERE mode != 'FULL';
Art. 25 Test scenarios for cyber-attacks and data corruption DR drill in supervision mode; corruption-detection workflow switchover_log with selective mode + diagnostic Level 2 (integrity) results SELECT component_id, exit_code FROM check_events WHERE check_type = 'integrity' AND created_at > now() - interval '90 days';
Art. 27 Report on the outcomes of resilience testing /reports/compliance and /reports/rto endpoints report_compliance.pdf, report_rto.pdf curl /api/v1/apps/<id>/reports/compliance

Append-only guarantee

DORA Article 16 requires incident records that cannot be tampered with after the fact. AppControl enforces this at the schema level:

  • action_log, state_transitions, check_events, switchover_log, config_versions are append-only by design.
  • UPDATE and DELETE are not used by any backend code path against these tables (CI lint rule).
  • Retention is implemented as partition drop (check_events) or row archive (action_log → action_log_archive), never as in-place delete.

Inspect:

-- These tables have a CHECK / trigger or simply no UPDATE/DELETE in code paths
\dt action_log
\dt state_transitions
\dt switchover_log
\dt config_versions

For DORA Article 12 (reconstruction), the config_versions table stores both the before and after of every configuration change as JSONB. Auditors can reconstruct what the system looked like at any point in time:

-- What did application X look like on date Y?
SELECT after FROM config_versions
WHERE entity_id = '<aid>' AND created_at <= '2025-06-01'
ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1;

NIS2 mapping (Article 21)

NIS2 Article 21 lists 10 risk-management measures. The table below shows which AppControl mechanism supports each measure.

Measure (Art. 21.2) AppControl support How
(a) Policies on risk analysis and information system security Application-level mode (advisory / operate / drill / DR) — explicit choice of autonomy level UI applications.settings.mode; documented in README
(b) Incident handling FSM + append-only audit; 3-level diagnostic; rebuild engine action_log, state_transitions, diagnostic endpoints; see DORA Art. 16
© Business continuity (backup, DR, crisis management) DR switchover (6 phases), dry-run, drill mode switchover_log; see Disaster Recovery and DORA Art. 11–12
(d) Supply chain security mTLS-only ingest of agents; signed binary updates; enrollment audit pki_authorities, enrollment_tokens, signed agent bundles; see Security Architecture §3, §12
(e) Security in network and information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance SBOM published with every release; Trivy scan in CI; semver-versioned upgrades release-assets/sbom.cdx.json; UPGRADE.md
(f) Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures Compliance and RTO reports; drill records; hardening checklist /reports/compliance; HARDENING.md
(g) Basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training Hardening checklist; operator role separation HARDENING.md
(h) Policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and encryption mTLS, TLS 1.3, scram-sha-256 for DB; encrypted backups TLS config; BACKUP_RESTORE.md — Encryption
(i) Human-resources security, access control policies and asset management RBAC, workspaces, SAML group sync, share links with expiry app_permissions_users/teams, workspace_*, saml_group_mappings, app_share_links
(j) Multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions MFA depends on the upstream IdP. AppControl uses OIDC / SAML — enforce MFA in your IdP (Keycloak, Okta, Azure AD). Local-auth flows do not enforce MFA. OIDC / SAML configuration on the IdP side

MFA caveat

AppControl does not itself implement MFA. Multi-factor authentication is enforced at the IdP layer (OIDC / SAML). Disable local-auth in production (set APP_ENV=production) so MFA cannot be bypassed.


Exporting evidence for an auditor

When an auditor (ACPR, EBA, national NIS2 competent authority, internal compliance) requests evidence, produce a report bundle using the endpoints below. Every report supports a configurable date range.

Audit trail (Art. 16)

# Full audit trail for an app over a given period
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/audit?from=2025-01-01&to=2025-12-31" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -o audit-2025.json

# Or organization-wide
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/reports/audit?from=2025-01-01&to=2025-12-31" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -o audit-org-2025.json

The JSON payload contains:

  • actions[]: every user-initiated action (start, stop, switchover, edit, etc.)
  • state_transitions[]: every component state change
  • enrollment_events[]: every agent enrollment
  • break_glass_sessions[]: every emergency-access session
  • For each entry: timestamp, actor (user_id + email), target, result, and a stable hash for chain-of-custody

Compliance report (DORA Article 27)

curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/compliance?year=2025" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -o compliance-2025.json

Includes:

  • Total drills executed (dry-runs + full switchovers)
  • Average and worst-case RTO
  • Number of incidents (FSM transitions to FAILED or UNREACHABLE)
  • Rebuild events with RTR (Recovery Time for Rebuild)

Incidents and DRP report (Art. 17 + Art. 11)

# Incidents
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/incidents?from=2025-01-01" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o incidents-2025.json

# Disaster Recovery Plan execution history
curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/pra" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o pra-history.json

Switchovers report (Art. 11 + Art. 25)

curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/pra" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o switchovers.json

The pra report (Plan de Reprise d'Activité — French acronym for DRP) lists every switchover, dry-run, and drill with phase-by-phase timing.

RTO report (Art. 12)

curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/rto?year=2025" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o rto-2025.json

Provides actual vs configured RTO per application, with deviation alerts when a switchover exceeded the configured target.

MTTR (Mean Time To Recovery)

curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/mttr?from=2025-01-01" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o mttr-2025.json

Calculated as the average time between FAILED → RUNNING transitions for an application's components, excluding planned operations.

Activity feed (live audit stream)

curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/activity?since=2025-12-31T00:00:00Z" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -o activity.json

Useful for real-time SIEM ingestion.

PDF bundle (one file per app, for the auditor)

curl "https://appcontrol.example.com/api/v1/apps/<app_id>/reports/export?period=2025" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -o appcontrol-evidence-2025.pdf

The PDF aggregates all of the above into a single signed file with:

  • Cover page (org name, period, generated-at timestamp)
  • DORA article cross-reference for each section
  • Audit trail (chronological)
  • Incident timeline
  • Switchover history with RTO/RPO
  • Rebuild history with RTR
  • Configuration version snapshots (before/after for every material change)
  • Signature footer (SHA-256 of the bundle; cross-references the action log)

The PDF is self-contained — an auditor can reconcile it against the JSON exports above.

Format reference

Endpoint Format Default range Notes
/audit JSON last 30 days Pass ?format=csv for spreadsheet ingest
/incidents JSON last 30 days Includes root-cause if labeled
/pra JSON last 12 months Phase-by-phase switchover detail
/compliance JSON last year Aggregate KPIs
/rto JSON last year per-app RTO actual vs target
/mttr JSON last 30 days per-app MTTR
/export PDF period parameter Full signed bundle

Report endpoint reference

Defined in crates/backend/src/api/reports/. All endpoints require JWT auth and at least view permission on the target app.

Endpoint File Purpose
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/audit audit.rs Full action_log + state_transitions for an app
GET /reports/audit audit.rs Org-wide audit (admin only)
GET /apps/:app_id/activity audit.rs Live activity feed
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/availability availability.rs Uptime / downtime per component
GET /apps/:app_id/health-summary availability.rs Component-level health rollup
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/compliance dora.rs Aggregated DORA compliance KPIs
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/rto dora.rs RTO analysis
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/mttr dora.rs MTTR analysis
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/pra incidents.rs DRP / switchover history
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/incidents incidents.rs Failure incidents
GET /apps/:app_id/reports/export export.rs PDF bundle

All endpoints accept from / to query parameters as ISO 8601 timestamps.


What AppControl does NOT cover

Honesty matters for compliance. AppControl is one tool in a regulated stack — these items require other systems.

Requirement Why AppControl does not cover it What does
Penetration testing (DORA Art. 26, TLPT) Out of scope — AppControl is the target, not the tester Third-party Red Team or TIBER-EU-aligned vendor
Third-party SBOM tracking for all dependencies AppControl publishes its own SBOM (CycloneDX) but does not catalog the SBOMs of every system it monitors Snyk, Dependency-Track, GitHub Advanced Security
Business continuity beyond IT (HR, premises, communications) DORA Art. 11 covers ICT continuity; broader BCM requires more BCM tool (ServiceNow BCM, Fusion Framework)
Vulnerability scanning of monitored hosts AppControl monitors application state, not OS-level CVEs Qualys, Tenable, Wiz, native cloud security center
Network IDS / IPS (NIS2 21(2)(b)) AppControl has rate limiting and mTLS auth but is not an IDS Suricata, Snort, Zscaler, cloud-native WAF
Encryption key management (DORA Art. 9, NIS2 21(2)(h)) AppControl uses keys but does not provide HSM functions HashiCorp Vault, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault
Centralized IAM with MFA AppControl delegates auth to OIDC / SAML — your IdP enforces MFA Keycloak, Okta, Azure AD, ADFS
Real-time SIEM correlation AppControl emits JSON logs and audit data; correlation is downstream Splunk, Elastic SIEM, Datadog, Sentinel
Application-layer DLP AppControl does not inspect business data Microsoft Purview, Symantec DLP
Outsourcing register (DORA Art. 28–30) AppControl tracks ICT inventory, not third-party contracts GRC tool (Archer, ServiceNow GRC)
Quantitative ICT risk assessment (DORA Art. 6) AppControl provides metrics (RTO, MTTR, RTR) — quantification of business risk is your CFO's job Risk-management tool fed by AppControl exports

AppControl is the operational evidence layer. It supplies the data (DAG, audit, state transitions, RTO measurements) that the items above consume.


Sanctions reference

For context, both regulations have material penalties:

DORA

  • Up to 2 % of the entity's annual global turnover for the firm.
  • Up to €1 million for individual senior managers, applied personally.
  • Plus reputational sanctions: public naming, business restrictions.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 50.

NIS2

  • Essential entities: up to €10 million or 2 % of global turnover (whichever is higher).
  • Important entities: up to €7 million or 1.4 % of global turnover.
  • Personal liability for executives in case of gross negligence.

Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Articles 34–35.

These thresholds are the rationale for treating audit retention and reconstruction capability as mandatory rather than nice-to-have.


Reference

External: